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ABSTRACT
Near Field Technology (NFC) enables a smartphone to em-
ulate a smart card, enabling it to provide services, like bank-
ing and transport ticketing. Similar to smart cards, NFC-
based transactions are susceptible to relay attacks. Distance
bounding protocols have been proposed for smart cards to
counter relay attacks. However, this may not be effective
in the field of mobile transactions, due to their require-
ment of high time-delay sensitivity and specialised hardware.
A number of proposals are being put forward that show
that sensing the natural ambient environment is an effective
anti-relay mechanism. Existing literature neither involves a
threat actor in their analysis nor they are in compliance with
EMV’s transaction requirement of 500ms. In this paper, we
look at the anti-relay mechanism from a different point of
view. Instead of measuring the natural ambience, we gen-
erate and measure a unique artificial ambient environment
(AAE) using peripherals of the devices involved in a trans-
action. To evaluate our proposal and its effectiveness, we
selected infrared from the proposed set of off-the-shelf ac-
tuator/sensor pairs available on modern smartphones. We
designed and deployed six distinct test-beds, each based on
a unique method of relay attack, in order to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of our proposal in the context of infrared. From
our experimentations, we can empirically state that infrared
showed high success rate in relay attack detection – higher
than any existing work in academic literature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Near Field Communication (NFC) [7] allows smartphones
to emulate contactless smart card functionality, enabling
them to provide smart card services, like banking and trans-
port ticketing. Such services have already been launched by
leading technology firms, like Google and Apple.
An attacker can use a relay attack to gain access to ser-
vices that a legitimate user is eligible for, such as payments
or access to buildings. Both smart card and smartphone
based contactless transactions are susceptible to relay at-
tacks. Distance bounding protocols have been proposed as
a countermeasure in the case of smart cards [6,8–10,14,22].
Distance bounding protocols however may not be applicable
in the case of NFC-enabled smartphones due to the mul-
titude of specialised hardware, and the high variability in
time delay during task execution [7, 13]. Sensing the natu-
ral ambient environment, using ambient sensors, has been
proposed instead as a strong candidate of proximity/relay
attack detection [9, 13, 18, 20, 25–27]. However, most of the
proposed methods do not adhere to industry requirements
in domains like payments and ticketing. Previous work has
shown that sensing the ambient environment may not pro-
vide adequate information regarding the proximity of two
devices, within the operational time frame of 500ms [5].
We are proposing the generation and measurement of a
unique artificial ambient environment (AAE) as a means
of proximity/relay attack detection, using the peripherals of
the devices involved in a transaction. A set of potential AAE
actuator/sensor pairs is proposed that are widely available
on modern smartphones. We selected infrared from that set,
for further evaluation. Six test-beds were deployed, using
different methods for attacking the proposed system. High
success rate was observed during the experimental phase,
regarding relay attack detection.
This work focuses on protecting against the off-the-shelf
attacker. There are limitations in the amount that can be
spent in a contactless transaction, for example in the UK
is currently set at £30 per transaction [24]. In the case of
more security critical scenarios, like access to governmental
buildings, smartphones may not provide adequate amount
of security [15].
The primary contributions of this paper include:
• Artificial Ambient Environment: We proposed a
generic framework for generation and measurement of
the AAE. In addition, this generic framework de-
fines the methodology of how two devices can ascertain
whether they are in proximity to each other. Discus-
sion of this framework is in Section 3.
• Infrared-Based AAE: We listed possible AAE actua-
tors, widely available on modern smartphones (Sec-
tion 3.1.2). Taking the generic framework, we designed
and built an evaluation test-bed, using infrared as an
AAE generator (Section 4).
• Effectiveness Analysis: We empirically evaluated the
effectiveness of using infrared as an AAE generator for
proximity/relay attack detection, against six distinct
relay attack scenarios (Section 5). The experimental
results indicated a high success rate in both proximity,
and relay attack detection.
2. CONTACTLESS MOBILE TRANSAC-
TIONS AND RELAY ATTACKS
To initiate an NFC-based mobile transaction, the NFC de-
vice is brought within the radio frequency range of a trans-
action terminal (<3-5cm distance). The contactless transac-
tion might require some form of authentication or authori-
sation, like a Personal Identification Number (PIN) code or
a biometric, although this is not always required [4]. How-
ever, authentication and/or authorisation are not effective
countermeasures to relay attacks, as in the case of the Mafia
fraud attack [8].
A relay attack [11, 12, 28] is a passive man-in-the-middle
attack during which an attacker is extending the commu-
nication distance of two legitimate devices by relaying each
communication message between them, without the legiti-
mate users’ consent. This way the attacker can be facilitated
to access legitimate user’s services.
For a smartphone-based contactless payment, an attacker
would have a malicious (compromised) payment terminal
and payment instrument. The malicious payment terminal
should be presented to a legitimate user and the malicious
payment instrument to a genuine payment terminal. Data
communicated during a transaction would be relayed be-
tween the attacking devices, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Relay Attack
Relay attack detection and prevention requires informa-
tion regarding the coexistence of the devices involved in a
transaction. As mentioned in Section 1, distance bound-
ing protocols available for smart cards may not work in the
field of smartphones. Several methods have been proposed
regarding relay attack prevention on NFC-enabled smart-
phones. Many of these methods attempt to detect device co-
existence during NFC transactions using the environmental
(ambient) sensors that are present in modern smartphones
(further discussion regarding related work in Section 6.1).
3. ARTIFICIAL AMBIENCE FOR PROX-
IMITY DETECTION (AAPD)
In this section the theoretical foundation of the proposed
framework is described and analysed.
3.1 Proposed Framework
Ambient sensors in smartphones measure a particular en-
vironmental or physical property of the immediate surround-
ing of the smartphone, like the light intensity, the ambient
sound, or the device’s acceleration. Existing literature, dis-
cussed in Section 6.1, argues two devices using ambient sen-
sors at the same time, for a short duration of time, can
provide proof of proximity.
Majority of the previous work however does not com-
ply with the EMV transaction requirement to complete in
500ms [2–4, 16]. According to [5], data captured in up to
500ms by any ambient sensor on off-the-shelves smartphones
cannot effectively provide proof of proximity.
Figure 2: Framework Architecture
We propose the generation of artificial ambient environ-
ments (AAEs) by using the smartphone’s peripherals, like
the speaker or the phone’s vibration. The aim is to increase
the irreproducibility of ambient environment to thwart the
relay attacks and establish strong proximity proof.
During an NFC transaction, one (unidirectional) or both
(bidirectional) devices involved in the transaction will gen-
erate (be actuators) and/or measure (be sensors) the AAE,
forming a second communication channel (Figure 2). This
second channel, referred to as Artificial Ambience Channel
(AAC), will be operating in parallel to the NFC channel, for
some predefined time.
Smartphones available in the market are not the same
in performance capabilities, operating system (OS), and/or
available ambient sensors. Depending on a device’s capabil-
ities, the two devices involved in a transaction can negotiate
the tuple {A,S, TSent,M} that will be used in the transac-
tion. A denotes the AAE actuator that will be used in the
transaction. S denotes the sensor which will measure the
AAE. TSent (where TSent ≤ 500ms), denotes the time for
which the AAE will be active. Finally, M denotes whether
the AAE generation will be unidirectional or bidirectional.
Upon the completion of the AAE measurement by the de-
vices involved in the transaction, a comparison between the
transmitted and measured data will take place either by one
or both devices, or by trusted third party. Transmission of
the captured measurement will be done in a secure man-
ner, integrated in the transaction protocol running on the
NFC channel (for on-device verification), or through a se-
cure network channel (for verification by third party). Such
an integration is beyond the scope of this paper.
During the comparison phase, only data exchanged
through the AAC while the AAE was active will be regarded
(TReceived, where TReceived = TSent). Thus, during a relay
attack AAE information will have to be successfully relayed
within the TSent time frame, or they will be discarded from
the comparison phase.
For an AAE generation method to be successful, the result
of the comparison should provide adequate proof of proxim-
ity. Therefore, the AAE should be difficult to be accurately
replicated by an attacker in a relay attack.
In this paper, only the properties of the AAC channel
are investigated. This is to empirically establish whether
AAE can provide an effective proof of proximity for relay
attack countermeasures and two-factor authentication, sim-
ilar to [17]. To investigate the proposed solution, test-beds
were developed using off-the-shelf and custom hardware.
3.1.1 Architecture Requirements
In order for a generated AAE to be suitable for relay at-
tack prevention, the following requirements should be met:
• The generation of the AAE should be based on some
random streams/sequences.
• The AAE generation and the establishment of proxim-
ity evidence should be easy for a genuine pair.
• The generated AAE should be hard to relay/reproduce
to a remote location, without detection.
3.1.2 Candidate Architecture
Peripherals widely available on smartphones that can po-
tentially be used to generate an AAE are: 1. Infrared,
2. Camera’s flash light, 3. Vibration, 4. Speaker (sound),
5. Bluetooth, 6. Device’s display, and 7. Camera
In this paper, we are focusing on Infrared transmitters,
that are widely available in different smartphones1, mainly
for allowing users to control home equipment, like televi-
sions [1].
4. INFRARED AS AAPD
Infrared is a form of electromagnetic radiation with a
wavelength outside of the visible spectrum for the human
eye. Infrared emitters exist in a wide range of modern
smartphones, and their main purpose is for controlling home
equipment (e.g. televisions). In our evaluations we used An-
droid handsets, as Android provides an API for transmitting
infrared signals [1].
In this section, we describe the architecture and deploy-
ment of the test-bed for evaluation of infrared AAPD and
its effectiveness against six different relay attack techniques.
4.1 Test-bed Architecture – Infrared
Figure 3 depicts the architecture of the test-bed for eval-
uation of infrared as an AAE. Two scenarios were regarded.
First, a transaction between the mobile device TI, and the
transaction terminal TT’ (referred to as TI-TT’). This sce-
nario aims to evaluate the proximity detection capabilities
of the framework, and no relay is involved between the pair.
Second, a transaction between the mobile device TI, and the
transaction terminal TT (referred to as TI-TT). In this sce-
nario, the pair TT’-TI’ is attempting to relay the infrared
generated AAE. Figure 4 shows a more clear representation
of the devices involved in the two scenarios.
4.1.1 Proximity Scenario
In the first scenario, upon the initiation of the transaction,
TI begins emitting a sequence consisting of 500 random pre-
generated bits through its infrared emitter. The transaction
1Devices with infrared emitters: https://goo.gl/4tVORN
Figure 3: The Evaluation Framework
Figure 4: Test-bed Scenarios
terminal, TT’, captures the transmitted sequence. After the
completion of the transaction the transmitted and captured
bits are compared for similarity by a trusted third party
(during the course of our experiments, a laptop running the
comparison software). The comparison step can also poten-
tially be performed by one of the devices involved in the
transaction, as mentioned in Section 3, but this is out of the
scope of this work.
The infrared emitter is technically a LED that emits elec-
tromagnetic radiation at the infrared spectrum. In order
to transmit the 500 bits through it, they first had to be
converted to pulses and pauses. After experimentation, we
set that one bit is represented by a 200µs pulse (emission)
or pause (no emission). Although infrared at 38.4kHz fre-
quency (used during our experiments) can theoretically emit
one bit per 13µs, we could effectively emit one bit in no less
than 200µs, using the available mobile devices.
Sub-sequences of ones and zeros from the random 500-bit
sequence are encoded into pulse and pause durations (e.g.
a sub-sequence of two consecutive ones will be encoded in
a 400µs pulse, a sub-sequence of three consecutive zeros by
a pause of 600µs, and so on). The 500-bit sequence re-
quires 100ms of transmission through the infrared emitter
(TSent = 100ms). Figure 5 represents the conversion of the
bit-sequence “1101110011” into pulse and pause timings.
Figure 5: Time Representation of Bit-Sequence
“1101110011”
An infrared receiving diode capable of sensing infrared
radiation, is attached to the transaction terminal, and ac-
cessed through software in order to time the pulse and pause
sequences. The terminal listens for infrared signals for the
whole period of the transaction. Intercepted pulse and pause
timings are then decoded into a bit sequence. In case the
data comparison should take place on one of the devices in-
volved in the transaction, the infrared listening period can
be reduced, according to the requirements of the desired
transaction protocol. However, integrating the proposed
framework in a particular protocol is beyond the scope of
this paper.
As mentioned in Section 3, some time may be required
before an AAE actuator can be initialised. In the case of
the Android devices used in our experiments, through ex-
perimentation we concluded that time xi was required be-
fore a device could start emitting infrared, and time xj was
required for the process to shut down, after emission had
stopped. Since we did not have low level access to the API
calls, we were not able to accurately calculate these delays.
Modifying the Android operating system (OS) was also not
an option, as after inspection of the OS’s source code we be-
lieve that both delays are caused by the proprietary infrared
drivers of the devices. Because of the infrared Android API,
we were only able to know the total time of the infrared
transmission process (referred to as TAAE). However, after
analysis of 150 runs of the infrared transmission process, we
were able to calculate xj to be equal to 28±2ms. Therefore,
since TAAE can be measured by an application, and TSent
and xj are known, Eq. 1 provides xi.
xi = TAAE − TSent − xj (1)
During the comparison phase, any data received by the
transaction terminal prior to time xi (compared to the ini-
tiation of the transaction) or after time xi + TSent is dis-
carded. This time frame is referred to as TReceived. This
aids towards the avoidance of relay attacks through replay
(an attacker having captured the whole sequence transmit-
ted by the legitimate mobile device and replaying it to a
remote transaction terminal). Taking into account the 4ms
window (equivalent to 10 bits) introduced by xj :
xi − 2ms ≤ TReceived ≤ xi + TSent + 2ms (2)
The runtime of TReceived is TSent + 4ms. The 4ms window
can potentially be eliminated by enhancements in the An-
droid API and the device drivers. As mentioned earlier, this
is not possible without access to the driver source code.
4.1.2 Relay Scenario
In the second scenario shown in Figure 4, the same princi-
ples apply. The difference is that in this case, the malicious
pair TT’-TI’ is introduced. The malicious terminal TT’ is
capturing infrared signals transmitted by the genuine mo-
bile TI, forwards them to TI’, which plays them towards
TT. The challenge for the attacker is to be able to cor-
rectly relay bits in no more than 200µs (the length of one
bit) from the time of receiving them. Delay in transmis-
sion of a few bits will lead to introduction of new bits, since
pauses or pulses will last longer. Also caching for longer
than the 4ms window explained above will cast the attack
detectable, since not enough bits will be captured within
the time frame TReceived. Caching however may cause an
overhead, since it requires data to be pushed in and popped
from a buffer, that may render it inefficient for such short
time frame. Moreover, as already mentioned, the 4ms time
frame may be reduced by enhancing the Android API and
device drivers.
4.2 Data Collection
During our experiments, device TT’ was acting as both
a legitimate and a relay terminal. Thus, at the same time
it was saving and relaying to TI’ infrared signals. A more
thorough comparison was possible this way, since we were
able to juxtapose data captured by TT’ and TT, when com-
pared against the same bit-sequence transmitted by device
TI. On both devices, captured infrared pulse and pause tim-
ings (in µs) were saved in different log files for each trans-
action, along with the time (in µs) at which the first bit
was received, compared to the initiation of the transaction.
Device TI was appending the random bit stream, along with
time TAAE , in a .csv file. Calculation of xi (as Eq. 1), and
consequently of the bounds of TReceived were thus possible.
These files were used during the evaluation phase, described
in Section 5. After the completion of a transaction, device
TI would generate a new random-bit sequence, to be used
in the next transaction.
All the devices involved in the experiments were connected
to a single, dedicated Wi-Fi network. The indication of
the transaction initiation was performed through a network
broadcast, transmitted by TI. Assessment of the NFC chan-
nel is out of the scope of this paper, and an NFC initiated
relay would require tapping on both TT’ and TT simulta-
neously in order to ensure the maximum efficiency of the
attacker. Such task may be hard to accomplish, even in a
controlled environment. Initiating the transaction through
a network broadcast satisfies this requirement. However, in
a realistic scenario, the transaction initiation would be ac-
complished through the NFC channel, and an attacker would
have to overcome the additional barrier of synchronising the
tapping of TI’ with that of TI.
In the next section we discuss different test-bed variant
deployments that were used to evaluate our proposal.
4.3 Deployed Test-beds with Relay Attack
Variants
In order to assess the effectiveness of the framework
against relay attacks, six different variants of the test-bed
were deployed, based on potential relay attack configura-
tions.
In all experiments, a Samsung Galaxy S5 mini (SM-
G800F, running Android 5.1.1) was used as device TI. Rasp-
berry Pi 3 computers (4x1.2GHz CPU and 1GB RAM), run-
ning Raspbian Jessie were used as devices TT’ and TT. The
Raspberry Pi (RPi) was a good candidate for acting as a ter-
minal device, as it is equipped with 40 General Purpose In-
put Output (GPIO) pins, making it possible to easily build
prototypes. In the case of the device TT’, except from lis-
tening for infrared signals, it was also relaying them towards
device TI’ (except in Test-beds 5 and 6 described below,
where TT’ and TT were running the same application).
4.3.1 Test-bed 1: Mobile Based
In the first scenario, a mobile device (Samsung Galaxy
S4 – GT-I9505, running Android 5.0.1) was used as device
TI’. Timings of detected infrared pulses and pauses were
transmitted from TT’ to TI’ through the Wi-Fi channel. In
the case of a pulse, TI’ would use the ConsumerIrManager
class [1] (Android infrared API). In the case of a pause, TI’
would wait for the indicated time, before playing the next
available pulse.
4.3.2 Test-bed 2: RPi Based (no caching)
Using a mobile device for infrared emission was proven to
be inefficient, due to severe delays at transmitting any data
via the infrared emitter (further discussion in Section 5).
A custom built RPi-based relay device was used as device
TI’ in this scenario instead. An infrared emitting LED was
connected to the GPIO pins of the RPi, and controlled by a
program written in the C language (for performance reasons)
using the GPIO access C library WiringPi2. Device TT’ was
used for relaying infrared data to TI’ through the wireless
network. Unlike in the previous scenario, whenever infrared
state alteration was perceived (switch from pulse to pause,
or the opposite), TT’ would send a UDP packet to TI’. The
application built for TI’ would listen for UDP packets from
TT’, and upon packet arrival it would switch the state of the
attached infrared LED, attempting to replicate the sequence
played by TI.
The same libraries and programming tools as in this sce-
nario were also used in test-beds 3 and 4.
4.3.3 Test-bed 3: RPi Based (caching – TI’ side)
Because there are inconsistencies in the packet delivery
time through the network, using the method described in
Test-bed 2, extra bits might be introduced or subtracted
from the infrared sequence played by TI’, depending on the
delay of subsequent packets. In order to reduce the number
of packets that have to be transmitted, therefore reducing
the number of potential added/removed bits, an attacker can
cache data and relay in chunks. As mentioned in Section 4.1
, due to xj , an attacker has a window of approximately 4ms
during which data can be cached.
In this scenario, TT’ would transmit pulse and pause tim-
ings, upon alteration of the perceived infrared state. Upon
receiving by TI’, the pulse-pause timings would be pushed
in a stack (array), and 4ms after the arrival of the first
packet, TI’ would initiate playing them. Using a timer, TI’
then plays the received sequence, altering the state of the
infrared emitter as per the timings received by TT’.
Delays on the network may cause inconsistencies in the
delivery time between two packets. In order to minimise
the amount of inconsistencies in the bit stream, delays were
handled. In case the next packet arrives while the data
received by the previous packet is still being emitted, its
data is cached by TI’ and played after the completion of the
current instructions. In case the next packet is delayed, the
state of the infrared will not change, until new instructions
have arrived.
4.3.4 Test-bed 4: RPi Based (caching – TT’ side)
In this scenario, TT’ caches infrared state alterations for
4ms before forwarding to TI’. Although this scenario is sim-
ilar to the previous, the amount of generated network traffic,
which was concluded to be a bottleneck to the relay process,
is reduced, since data packets are relayed in 4ms buckets in-
stead of per infrared state alteration. The cached informa-
tion forwarded to TI’ indicate the pulse-pause sequence tim-
ings that should be played by TI’, in µs. The same method
2WiringPi website: http://wiringpi.com/
as in the previous scenario was used for playing the infrared
sequences, caching data that arrive early and altering the
state of the infrared LED when the stack is empty.
4.3.5 Test-bed 5: Infrared Extender Based
Wireless remote control extenders are available in the
market. These are devices that come in pairs and convert
infrared signals to radio-waves (receiver side) and back to in-
frared (transmitter side). The typical use of such devices is
to control infrared remote controlled home equipment from
a distance (e.g. from another room). This is achieved by
repeating or relaying infrared sequences transmitted by the
remote control.
Marmitek Powermid XL, a relaying wireless remote con-
trol extender, was used during the evaluation phase. Accord-
ing to the manufacturer, the range of the product is up to
100m (free field) or up to 25m (through walls). After inspec-
tion of the product’s circuit, the receiving device appears to
be applying current to an antenna through an infrared re-
ceiving diode. Therefore, the circuit remains open when no
infrared is detected, and it closes, making it transmit at
433.39MHz frequency, when pulses at the infrared spectrum
are detected. On the other side, when the receiving antenna
captures a signal at 433.39MHz, a circuit is closed, powering
three infrared emitters. The product was successfully tested
for controlling home appliances from a distance.
4.3.6 Test-bed 6: Random Generation Based
In the last test-bed scenario, a different random sequence
was generated and played by a second device. The same
device as in Test-bed 1 was used as an TI’, which was listen-
ing for broadcasts regarding transaction initiation as well.
Upon receiving a broadcast, it would initiate emission of a
pre-generated infrared sequence, in a similar way as TI.
Although we assume that Android’s random number gen-
erator is secure, this scenario was assessed mainly for refer-
ence reasons.
5. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
The evaluation methodology, the results, and the discus-
sion of the results are presented in this section.
5.1 Data Analysis Methodology
The evaluation was conducted in two phases. During the
first phase of evaluation, 50 transactions were performed
in the lab for each of the test-beds. After the comple-
tion of each experimental phase, data from the RPis and
the mobile device used as TI was transferred to a laptop
(2x2.7GHz Intel i7 CPU and 8GB of RAM, running Fedora
24 OS) for analysis. The transfer was accomplished through
SSH and USB cable, respectively. A program, written in
Java, would then convert the captured pulse-pause sequence
timings, recorded by TT’ and TT, of each transaction into
streams of bits. Only bits captured within time TReceived
were regarded. Translation of pulse-pause timings into bits
was accomplished by inverting the methodology described
in Section 4.1. For this, time TAAE of each transaction was
also given as an argument to the program. The dwdiff3 pro-
gram was used for the comparison of the bit streams. This
tool uses the GNU diff utility in order to detect the longest
common sub-sequences between two lines (in our scenario
3dwdiff website: http://os.ghalkes.nl/dwdiff.html
Table 1: Similarity Percentage Between Sent and Received Bits
Test-bed 1 Test-bed 2 Test-bed 3 Test-bed 4 Test-bed 5 Test-bed 6
Genuine Pair 98.86% 98.78% 98.34% 98.20% 98.28% 98.32%
Relay Pair 3.70% 44.72% 22.30% 30.76% 81.94% 69.56%
Figure 6: Test-bed Performance
each bit stream corresponded to one line), and based on
that calculates the similarity percentage.
In the second evaluation phase, an additional 450 trans-
actions were performed, using the best performing test-bed
(Test-bed 5). The same evaluation procedure was followed.
5.2 Results Evaluation
Regarding the genuine transaction pair (TI-TT’), the sim-
ilarity between the transmitted and the received bit streams
was in all scenarios, except in nine cases, either 98% (in 17%
of all transactions) or 99% (in 81% of all transactions). In
these nine cases, a portion of the data was captured by TT’
in the TReceived time frame. The reason for the delay of TI
in transmitting the data is not clear, but may be related
to the extensive use of the device during the experiments.
However, some amount of failure is acceptable by the smart
card industry [21].
For the evaluation of the proposed solution, we set a
threshold of 98% similarity between the captured and trans-
mitted streams, based on the evaluation results of the gen-
uine pair. According to our results, the false negative rate
would therefore be less than 2%.
The average similarity percentages for the genuine pair
(TI-TT’) and the relay pair (TI-TT) for 50 runs for each
test-bed, are presented in Table 1. Test-bed 5 is an excep-
tion, as the average occurs from analysis of 500 runs. Fig-
ure 6 presents the similarity percentage of fifty individual
transactions, for all test-beds (randomly chosen in the case
of Test-bed 5).
The true negative rate, maintaining the threshold at 98%,
was 100%. None of the assessed relay methodologies were
capable of exceeding this threshold during our experiments.
In Test-bed 1, the mobile device was incapable of relaying
a significant amount of data in the given time frame. In
many occasions no data was relayed. Similar to the device
TI, the relay mobile device required time xi before it could
initiate the infrared transmission.
In Test-bed 2, due to inconsistencies in the network packet
transmission time, extra bits were frequently introduced or
deducted from the bit stream. For example, for two sub-
sequent infrared state alterations, in case of a delay in the
transmission of the second network packet, comparatively to
the arrival of the first packet, extra bits would be introduced
until the arrival of that packet. Similarly, if the transmission
delay of a third packet was shorter than that of the second,
bits would be deduced in the time frame between the second
and third packets.
Higher result consistency was noticed in Test-beds 3 and
4, compared to Test-bed 2, although the overall performance
was lower. In these scenarios, caching was causing an over-
head. Moreover, in contrast to Test-bed 2, in these scenarios
pause to pulse switching (and the opposite) were based on re-
layed signal timings, instead of a single network packet. The
overhead imposed due to the previous, caused detectable
delays in relaying bits in the magnitude of microseconds.
Finally, the 4ms caching window proved to be insufficient
for caching, relaying and replaying signals. Test-bed 4 per-
formed better than Test-bed 3, but although less than half
the network packets were required in comparison to Test-bed
3, Test-bed 4 had to cache data on both sides of the relay,
which led to suboptimal increase in the overall performance.
The highest performance was observed in Test-bed 5. Al-
most 52% of the captured relayed bit streams exceeded 90%
similarity upon comparison with the transmitted bit stream.
Almost 10% of which reached the maximum observed simi-
larity of 94%. However, white noise interference captured by
the antenna of the infrared extender was causing significant
bit irregularities in certain relayed streams, leading to incon-
sistencies in the reproducibility of the results. Even though
this technique produced a relatively high similarity, all the
relayed transactions were detected, since the threshold of
98% was not reached in any case.
Finally, Test-bed 6 was the second best performing test-
bed, even though in this test-bed, instead of signal relaying,
a different random sequence than the one produced by TI
was transmitted by TI’. In the design of a random num-
ber generator, the major concern is the unpredictability of
pseudo-random sequences, and not the percentage similar-
ity. In any pseudo-random sequence there is a chance that
two random numbers have high similarity, but not the same
sequence.
Other methods of attacking this system might exist, like
relay via fibre optic cable or utilising the infrared range (for
few metres), but due to their difficulty in concealment, and
distance limitations, as well as the high expense associated
with them, they were not investigated any further.
6. RELATED WORK AND FUTURE DI-
RECTIONS
In this section, the related work and future directions of
this work are discussed.
6.1 Related Work
Drimer et al. [9] and Ma et al. [18] used GPS (Global
Positioning System) to detect coexistence of NFC-enabled
mobile devices. The time frame used by Ma et al. was 10
seconds, and data collection was occurring on every second.
Upon completion of the data collection, data recorded by
the two parties would be compared. High success rate for
proximity detection was reported by the authors.
Ambient sound and light were used by Halevi et al. [13] as
a proximity detection method. The authors reported high
success rate, after measuring sound and light for 30 and
2 seconds respectively, and using multiple comparison al-
gorithms. Finally, their experiments were conducted in a
variety of physical locations.
Varshavsky et al. [27] suggested comparing the discovered
Wi-Fi networks, along with their strengths, as a method of
proximity detection. The authors reported positive results,
and although the work is mainly focussed on secure device
pairing, it is potentially applicable in the domain of mobile
transactions as well.
Urien et al. [26] proposed ambient temperature, in combi-
nation with an elliptic curve-based RFID and/or NFC au-
thentication protocol in order to detect device co-location.
Their proposal however was not implemented, therefore no
experimental data is available.
Mehrnezhad et al. [20] use the accelerometer to verify de-
vice proximity during a mobile payment transaction. The
user is called to tap twice on the terminal for the trans-
action to complete. Upon completion of the transaction,
sensor streams, measured by the two devices, are compared
for similarity. The recording time is stated to be between
0.6 and 1.5 seconds, and a high success rate is reported.
Truong et al. [25] assessed a variety of ambient sensors
for proximity detection, with positive results. However the
recording time frame of 10-120 seconds makes this method
inconclusive for many NFC-based mobile transactions.
Finally, Shrestha et al. [23] successfully used a Sensor-
drone (specialised hardware, featuring numerous ambient
sensors) for proximity detection. No specific sample dura-
tion is reported in this work, however the authors state that
data from each sensor was recorded for a few seconds.
Table 2 summarises the related work, by providing the
sensors used in each of these works, the sample duration (if
provided by the authors), and the suitability for using these
methods in contactless mobile transactions.
6.2 Future Directions
As part of our ongoing investigation, we are planning to
extend this work towards several directions. We are aiming
to explore and evaluate other AAE actuators, mentioned
in Section 3.1.2, and assess their performance in compari-
son to this work. In addition, investigate the integration of
AAC with traditional NFC protocols for effective proximity
detection. Finally, the usability, user acceptance, and per-
formance outside a lab environment are going to be assessed
through a field study.
7. CONCLUSION
Previous works has claimed that sensing the ambient envi-
ronment and comparing the measurements can be used as a
proximity detection method between two devices. However,
the effectiveness of this technique in certain types of trans-
actions that require to be completed in short time frames
Table 2: Related Work in Sensors as Anti-Relay
Mechanism
Paper Sensor(s) Used Sample Duration Contactless
Suitability
Ma et al. [19] GPS 10 seconds Unlikely
Halevi et al. [13] Audio 30 seconds Unlikely
Light 2 seconds More Likely
Varshavsky et al. [27] Wi-Fi (Radio Waves) 1 second More Likely
Urien et al. [26] Temperature N/A -
Mehrnezhad et al. [20] Accelerometer 0.6 to 1.5 Seconds More Likely
Truong et al. [25] GPS Raw Data 120 seconds Unlikely
Wi-Fi 30 seconds Unlikely
Ambient Audio 10 seconds Unlikely
Bluetooth 12 seconds Unlikely
Shrestha et al. [23] Temperature (T) Few seconds Unlikely
Precision Gas (G) Few seconds Unlikely
Humidity (H) Few seconds Unlikely
Altitude (A) Few seconds Unlikely
HA Few seconds Unlikely
HGA Few seconds Unlikely
THGA Few seconds Unlikely
(≤ 500ms), like banking and transport related transactions,
has been argued.
In this paper we have proposed the generation of artifi-
cial ambient environments (AAEs) as a means of proxim-
ity/relay attack detection in smartphone contactless trans-
actions with short timing restrictions. Out of a list of AAEs
that we have provided, we have evaluated the proposed solu-
tion by using infrared as an AAE actuator. Six distinct ways
of attacking the system were designed, built, and evaluated.
Our experimental results showed that infrared has a high
success rate for relay attack detection, as well as for prox-
imity detection. None of the attack methods were capable
of evading our framework.
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